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The human amygdala plays a key role in recognizing facial
emotions and neurons in the monkey and human amygdala
respond to the emotional expression of faces. However, it remains
unknown whether these responses are driven primarily by proper-
ties of the stimulus or by the perceptual judgments of the
perceiver. We investigated these questions by recording from
over 200 single neurons in the amygdalae of 7 neurosurgical
patients with implanted depth electrodes. We presented degraded
fear and happy faces and asked subjects to discriminate their
emotion by button press. During trials where subjects responded
correctly, we found neurons that distinguished fear vs. happy
emotions as expressed by the displayed faces. During incorrect
trials, these neurons indicated the patients’ subjective judgment.
Additional analysis revealed that, on average, all neuronal
responses were modulated most by increases or decreases in re-
sponse to happy faces, and driven predominantly by judgments
about the eye region of the face stimuli. Following the same anal-
yses, we showed that hippocampal neurons, unlike amygdala neu-
rons, only encoded emotions but not subjective judgment. Our
results suggest that the amygdala specifically encodes the subjec-
tive judgment of emotional faces, but that it plays less of a role in
simply encoding aspects of the image array. The conscious percept
of the emotion shown in a face may thus arise from interactions
between the amygdala and its connections within a distributed
cortical network, a scheme also consistent with the long response
latencies observed in human amygdala recordings.
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The human amygdala plays a crucial role in processing sociallyand emotionally salient stimuli (1, 2). A large literature,
primarily from studies in animals, shows that the amygdala is
critical for conditioned fear responses (3). However, a number of
other studies show that it is involved also in broader aspects of
social perception, notably aspects of face processing (4). These
two themes converge in several human studies: there is an im-
pairment in recognizing fear faces in subjects that lack a functional
amygdala (5) in addition to the impairment of fear conditioning
(6, 7). Neuroimaging studies have also reported significant acti-
vation of the amygdala to fear faces (8).
In humans, it has been reported that amygdala neurons are
selective for a variety of visual stimuli (9, 10). One category of
stimuli that the amygdala plays a key role in analyzing is faces
and facial emotions. Subjects with amygdala damage fail to
recognize fear faces (5), although there is now a consensus that
the amygdala is involved in processing many emotions from faces,
not just fear (11). Electrophysiological recordings in monkeys have
found single neurons that respond not only to faces as such (12,
13), but also to face identities, facial expressions, and gaze direc-
tions (14, 15). Single neurons in the human amygdala discriminate
faces from inanimate objects (10). Furthermore, single neurons
in the human amygdala were found to encode whole faces selec-
tively (16) and show abnormal facial feature selectivity in autism
(17). Thus, there is substantial evidence from neurophysiological,
lesion, and functional MRI studies for the involvement of the pri-
mate amygdala in face processing.
More detailed investigations suggest that impaired fear rec-
ognition after amygdala damage can be attributed to a failure to
fixate on the eyes (18), suggesting that the amygdala might act as
a detector of perceptual saliency and biological relevance (19,
20). This was complemented by a neuroimaging study showing
that amygdala activity was specifically enhanced for fear faces
when saccading from the mouth to the eye region (21). Patients
with schizophrenia (22), social phobia (23), and autism (24) also
show abnormal facial scanning patterns, which have been hy-
pothesized to result from amygdala dysfunction (25). The func-
tional role of the amygdala is supported by its connection with
visual cortices specialized for face processing (26–28) as well as
reciprocal connections with multiple visually responsive areas in
the temporal (29–31) and frontal lobes (32). All of these find-
ings, while supporting a clear role for the amygdala in face
processing, also suggest that this role may be relatively specific
for certain properties or features of faces, raising the question of
what function distinguishes the amygdala’s role in face process-
ing from the better-known role of temporal cortex in face pro-
cessing (Discussion). We focused on one particular question in
the present study.
Neurons in the monkey and human amygdala respond to the
emotional expression of faces, but it remains unknown whether
these responses are driven primarily by image properties of the
stimuli, by the perceptual judgments of the perceiver, or by be-
havioral categorization in terms of motor output. To investigate
this question, we recorded 210 neurons from 7 neurosurgical
patients with implanted depth electrodes on an established
“bubbles” task (18, 33), in which patients discriminated emotions
from sparsely sampled fear or happy faces. We first characterize
neurons that distinguished fear vs. happy emotions expressed by
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the displayed faces, on those trials where subjects responded
correctly. Next we show that these neurons tracked the patients’
subjective judgment regardless of whether it was correct or in-
correct. Population permutation analysis confirmed the robust-
ness of this result, on average, across the entire population of
neurons. Our data suggest that neuronal responses within the
human amygdala are selective for perceived emotion shown in
faces and track subjective judgment expressed by behavior rather
than visual properties of the stimuli.
Results
Behavioral Performance. We recorded single neurons in the hu-
man amygdala while neurosurgical patients performed an emo-
tion discrimination task (Table S1; see Fig. S1A for recording
sites for each patient). All patients (nine sessions from seven
patients in total; two patients did two sessions; neurons from
each individual recording session are considered independent
even if they are from the same patient) were undergoing epilepsy
monitoring and had normal basic ability to discriminate faces.
Six healthy subjects (six sessions) served as behavioral controls
and participated in the same experiment. Subjects were asked to
judge, for every trial, whether the stimulus was fear or happy by
pushing corresponding buttons as quickly and accurately as pos-
sible (Fig. 1). Each trial was fear or happy with 50% probability.
No other attribute of the stimuli (such as identity) predicted the
emotion. Each stimulus was preceded by a phase-randomized
baseline image of equal luminance and complexity (“scramble”).
Trials with no response (timeouts; Methods) were excluded
from analysis.
We showed randomly selected parts of faces (bubbles; Fig. 1B)
that allowed us to derive a behavioral classification image (BCI)
(33) based on accuracy and reaction time (RT) of the responses
(derived separately for happy-face trials and fear-face trials; Fig.
1C). The BCI shows, for every pixel, whether revealing this pixel
is likely to increase accuracy and decrease RT. The higher a
pixel’s value, the more it contributed to behavioral judgment in
the task. BCIs from patients and controls did not differ within
key facial features [regions of interest (ROIs) used are shown in
Fig. 1B; two-tailed unpaired t test comparing average z scores
within the ROIs: for fear-face trials, P = 0.51 for eyes and P =
0.36 for mouth; for happy-face trials, P = 0.68 for eyes and P =
0.14 for mouth], confirming that patients performed the task
with a normal strategy. Both patients and controls primarily used
information revealed by eyes to judge fear faces, whereas they
used more mouth information to judge happy faces, consistent
with previous studies (34, 35).
Patients were able to learn the task normally compared with
controls (Fig. 1 D and F; SI Results), even though they were
slightly slower to respond (Fig. 1E). Importantly, there was no
difference in accuracy or RT between “fear” or “happy” responses
for both correct trials and incorrect trials (SI Results), showing that
neither patients nor controls had a response bias. Overall, the
behavioral performance-related metrics confirmed that patients
were alert and attentive and had largely normal ability to dis-
criminate emotion from faces.
Emotion-Selective Neurons. Two hundred and ten single units were
isolated from nine recording sessions in seven patients. Of these,
185 units (102 in the right amygdala, 83 in the left) that had an
average firing rate of at least 0.2 Hz were chosen for further
analysis. Structural MRI analyses of the amygdala with the elec-
trodes in situ showed that recordings were mostly from the baso-
medial and basolateral nucleus of the amygdala (Fig. S1A). Elec-
trodes were positioned such that their tips were located in the
upper third to center of the deep amygdala, ∼7 mm from the
uncus. Microwires projected medially out at the end of the depth
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Fig. 1. Stimuli and behavioral performance. (A) Task structure. Immediately preceding the target image, a scrambled version of a face was presented for
a variable time between 0.8 and 1.2 s. The target image was presented for 500 ms and showed either a fear (50%) or happy (50%) expression. Subjects
indicated whether the presented face was happy or fear. (B) Example bubbles stimuli. The ROIs used for analysis are shown in red (not shown to subjects). (C)
Behavioral classification images for fear- and happy-face trials for the neurosurgical patients and control subjects. Color code is the z-scored correlation
between the presence or absence of a particular region of the face and behavioral performance. (D) Learning curve for both patients (n = 8 sessions, 1 session
omitted here because the learning algorithm was disabled as a control; mean ± SEM) and controls (n = 6 sessions). Only first 200 trials are shown. (E) Reaction
time for patients (n = 9 sessions, circles) and controls (n = 6 sessions, squares). Each data point represents a single recording session and the error bars denote
SEM of the mean. Fear correct: fear-face trials with a correct response; Happy correct: happy-face trials with a correct response; Fear incorrect: fear-face trials
but incorrectly judged as happy; Happy incorrect: happy-face trials but incorrectly judged as fear. (F) Response choice for patients (n = 9 sessions, circles) and
controls (n = 6 sessions, squares).
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electrode and electrodes were thus likely sampling neurons in the
midmedial part of the amygdala [basomedial nucleus or deepest
part of the basolateral nucleus (36)]. The isolation criteria and
other face-responsive characteristics of the same dataset were de-
scribed previously (16, 17). To analyze neuronal responses, we
aligned all trials to the onset of the face. The firing rate was
normalized by dividing by average baseline (the firing rate 500 ms
before scramble onset) across all trials, separately for each unit.
We here investigate the response characteristics of the amyg-
dala neurons to emotions. We define emotion-selective units as
those that responded differentially to fear faces compared with
happy faces. We selected emotion-selective units by comparing the
total number of spikes in a time window 250- to 1,750-ms post-
stimulus-onset between correct fear-face trials and correct happy-
face trials. A trial was classified as correct if the subject indicated
the emotion associated with the stimulus displayed (ground truth).
We used a one-tailed t test to identify units with a greater response
to fear faces or happy faces separately, each with α = 0.05. We
found that 24 units showed significantly greater response to fear
faces compared with happy faces (13.0%, binomial test on the
number of significant cells: P < 0.00001) and 17 units (9.2%, P <
0.01) that showed a greater response to happy faces compared
with fear faces. We refer to these units as neurons selective for
fear expressions (“fear-selective” for short) (Fig. 2 A and B) and
neurons selective for happy expressions (“happy-selective” for
short) (Fig. 2 C and D), respectively. The probability of observing
41 emotion-selective neurons in a population of 185 neurons by
chance is very low (P < 10−6, estimated by a binomial distribution
with false positive rate of 0.1 for each neuron due to performing
two one-tailed tests at P < 0.05), indicating that amygdala neurons
signal information about emotions (Table S2). However, we em-
phasize that we do not know the response selectivity of the same
neurons to other stimuli. In particular, it is possible that the same
neurons would also respond to other emotions that we did not test
in this study. Our labels of units as fear- or happy-selective are not
meant to imply that these units would not respond to other, not
tested, emotions or stimuli.
Fig. 2 shows four single-neuron examples (see Fig. S2 for more
examples). The fear-selective neurons (Fig. 2 A and B) increased
their activity for fear-face trials and decreased their activity in
happy-face trials. In contrast, the happy-selective neurons (Fig. 2
C and D) increased their activity in happy-face trials. On aver-
age, significant differences in response between fear and happy
faces appeared 625-ms post-stimulus-onset and lasted for up to
1.5 s (Fig. 3). For fear-selective neurons, the difference was
mainly due to a suppression of activity in happy-face trials (Fig.
3A), whereas for happy-selective neurons, it was mainly due to an
increase in activity for happy-face trials (Fig. 3B). A similar plot
for all recorded neurons (n = 185, Fig. S3) showed no significant
difference, indicating that overall mean activity was not different
between the two conditions.
So far we only considered trials where patients judged the
emotion expressed correctly. Here, correctness was assessed by
the ground truth of the stimuli, which control subjects have
classified unequivocally as either happy or fear when shown the
entire face for extended periods of time (37). How did the same
neurons respond during errors in emotional judgment? We next
compared the neuronal response during incorrect trials to the
response during correct trials (for which the neurons were se-
lected in the first place, see above). We found that the neuronal
response during incorrect trials was similar to the one for the
same behavioral response during correct trials rather than the
actual emotion shown. For example, when a fear face was in-
correctly judged as happy, the neurons responded as if a happy
face was correctly judged as happy (and vice versa; compare
magenta and blue lines for the examples shown in Fig. 2 A and
B). Similarly, when a happy face was incorrectly judged as fear,
the neurons responded as if a fear face had been correctly judged
as fear (compare green and red lines for the examples shown in
Fig. 2 C and D). In Fig. 2E, lines connect the conditions with the
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Fig. 2. Single-unit examples of emotion-selective neurons
in the amygdala. (A and B) Example fear-selective neurons,
which have a higher firing rate for correct fear-face trials
compared with correct happy-face trials (selection t test:
P < 0.005). (C and D) Example happy-selective neurons,
which have a higher firing rate for correct happy-face trials
compared with correct fear-face trials (selection t test: P <
10−8). Each raster (Upper) and PSTH (Lower) is shown with
color coding as indicated. Trials are aligned to face stim-
ulus onset (dark gray shade, fixed 500-ms duration). Trials
within each stimulus category are sorted according to re-
action time (black line). Waveforms for each unit are
shown at the top of the raster plot. (E) Average firing rate
250- to 1,750-ms post-stimulus-onset for each unit. Red:
fear-face trials with a correct response; blue: happy-face
trials with a correct response; magenta: fear-face trials but
incorrectly judged as happy; green: happy-face trials but
incorrectly judged as fear. Black lines connect conditions
with the same response: fear (black) and happy (gray). Note
that the lines do not cross, implying that whatever response
tuning the neuron had was maintained regardless of
whether the response was correct or not. Error bars de-
note ±SEM across trials. Two-tailed t tests were applied to
compare between conditions. *: P < 0.05, **: P < 0.01,
and ***: P < 0.001. n.s.: not significant (P > 0.05).
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same response (fear or happy). Note that the lines do not in-
tersect, indicating that the relationship between the responses
for the two emotions was similar in correct and incorrect trials,
regardless of overall mean firing rate. For example, if a neuron
showed a greater response in fear-face correct trials compared
with happy-face correct trials, it would also show a greater re-
sponse in happy-face incorrect trials compared with fear-face
incorrect trials. Thus, firing rate increased whenever a judgment
of fear was made, regardless of whether it was correct or in-
correct. The neuronal response of the examples shown in Fig. 2
thus indicated the subjective perceptual judgment that subjects
made, rather than the ground truth of the emotion shown in
the stimulus. A significant interaction between stimulus emotion
(fear–happy) and accuracy of judgment (correct–incorrect) as
tested by a 2 × 2 ANOVA with number of spikes fired in a 1.5-s
window after stimulus onset (250- to 1,750-ms post-stimulus-
onset) confirmed this impression: the interaction term was sig-
nificant for all example neurons at P < 0.01 [F(1,429) = 9.04 for
Fig. 2A, F(1,405) = 7.09 for Fig. 2B, F(1,429) = 16.06 for Fig. 2C,
and F(1,429) = 9.47 for Fig. 2D]. We next quantified this phe-
nomenon across the population.
Interactive Neurons Encode Perceptual Judgment of Emotions Other
than Ground Truth Shown in Stimulus. We next assessed for all
neurons whether there was a significant interaction between the
emotion shown and the correctness of the subject’s judgment
using a two-way ANOVA ([correct vs. incorrect trials] × [fear
stimuli vs. happy stimuli]). Units with a significant interaction
term are referred to as “interactive units” henceforth, and reflect
the subjective judgment regardless of the emotion shown in the
image. There were 23 units with a significant interaction term
(12.4%, binomial test P < 0.00005), 10 of which responded with
a higher firing rate in correct fear-face trials and 13 of which
responded with a higher firing rate in correct happy-face trials,
hence denoted as fear interactive neurons and happy interactive
neurons, respectively (Table S2).
To further quantify the response of the interactive neurons, we
next plotted the average baseline-normalized firing rate for
correct and incorrect trials for each interactive neuron (Fig. 4 A
and B). Each neuron contributed two data points: one for correct
(red, blue) and one for incorrect trials (gray), respectively. By
definition, fear interactive neurons increased their firing rate for
correctly identified fear face trials (Fig. 4A, red). Similarly,
happy interactive neurons increased their firing rate for correctly
identified happy face trials (Fig. 4B, blue). Incorrect trials (gray
dots), in contrast, tended to have greater firing rates for the
emotion opposite to the one actually shown in the stimulus (fear
interactive neurons: Fig. 4A; χ2-test on the number of neurons
falling on each side of the diagonal line (gray bars), P < 10−5;
happy interactive neurons: Fig. 4B, P < 0.01). In each case, the
mean of all incorrect trials from all neurons was on the opposite
side of the diagonal shown in Fig. 4 from that for correct trials:
the average normalized firing rate thus indicated the behavioral
judgment of the subjects.
To summarize the population response, we next visualized the
mean difference in response between fear and happy stimuli for
both correct and incorrect trials (Fig. 4C). For fear interactive
neurons, this response difference tended to be positive for cor-
rect and negative for incorrect trials (Fig. 4C, red) and vice versa
for happy interactive neurons (Fig. 4C, blue). Thus, the response
during incorrect trials tended to be similar to the correct trials
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of the opposite emotional category. This result shows that in-
teractive neurons code the subjective judgment of emotion.
To directly relate neuronal responses to the emotion judg-
ments made on the task, we next performed a single-trial analysis
that permits analysis of response variability. In contrast, the
analysis discussed so far was based on an average across all fear-
or happy-face trials for each neuron. We used a simple response
index Ri as a single-trial metric (Eq. 1), which takes into account
the opposite signs of the two types of neurons—the fear type and
the happy type—and normalizes for different baseline firing
rates. The response index is a function of a neuron’s response in
a 1.5-s interval starting 250 ms after stimulus onset (the same in-
terval used above for selecting emotion-selective and interactive
cells). Ri is equal to the firing rate during a particular trial i, minus
the mean firing rate of all correct happy-face trials divided by the
average of the baseline (Eq. 1). For example, if a neuron doubles
its firing rate for a fear stimulus and remains at baseline for a
happy stimulus, the response index would equal 100%. By defi-
nition, Ri is negative for happy units, and thus we multiplied Ri
by −1 if the unit was previously classified as a happy unit (Eq. 2).
We next used the response index as defined above to quantify
trial-by-trial variability by comparing the distribution of Ri be-
tween different conditions. For the interactive neurons (n = 23),
the distribution for fear and happy stimuli was significantly dif-
ferent for both correct and incorrect trials (two-tailed two-sample
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test, P < 0.0005 for both correct and
incorrect trials, Fig. 4D). Comparing the distributions using a cu-
mulative distribution function (Fig. 4D; Methods) shows that the
response during incorrect trials was similarly distributed compared
with the correct trials of the opposite category. For example,
happy-face incorrect trials (Fig. 4D, green curve) were similarly
distributed to fear-face correct trials (Fig. 4D, red curve), and vice
versa. Confirming this observation, there was no significant differ-
ence between happy-face incorrect and fear-face correct trials (KS
test, P = 0.62) nor between fear-face incorrect and happy-face
correct trials (P = 0.087, uncorrected). Thus, single-trial neuronal
responses confirmed the previous cell-by-cell findings. The mean of
the distribution of response indices for both fear-face correct and
happy-face incorrect trials (in both cases the perceptual judgment
was fear) had response indices significantly above 0 (Fig. 4E; two-
tailed one-sample t test, P < 10−13 for fear-face correct trials and
P < 0.0005 for happy-face incorrect trials), and there was no sig-
nificant difference between correct and incorrect trials for fear
subjective judgments (two-tailed two-sample t test comparing fear
correct and happy incorrect, P = 0.99). Interestingly, there was
a significant difference between the two types of happy subjective
judgments (comparing happy correct and fear incorrect, P = 0.027),
with fear-face incorrect trials significantly below 0 (t test against 0:
P < 0.05). This was because the firing rate for fear-face incorrect
trials was lower than it was for happy-face correct trials. Separate
analyses for only fear- or happy-selective neurons led to similar
results (Fig. S4), with both classes of neurons showing the same
pattern of response independently. In conclusion, we found that the
neurons with a significant interaction term encoded the perceptual
judgment made by the patient rather than the stimulus identity, at
both the single-neuron and single-trial level.
Emotion-Selective Neurons Encode Perceptual Judgment. Are all
emotion-selective neurons sensitive to subjective judgment, or is
this a property only of a subset of neurons? Above, we explicitly
selected for a significant interaction to begin with, and sub-
sequently analyzed this subgroup. To obtain a broader inventory,
we next analyzed the previously described units (n = 41, among
which 6 were fear interactive neurons and 3 were happy in-
teractive neurons; Table S2) that were only selected for emotion
selectivity on correct trials (incorrect trials were not used for this
selection). We computed the response indices for every trial and
pooled across all trials as described above in our analysis of in-
teractive neurons. We then computed a population summary
metric that summarized the response difference across a group
of cells as the mean difference between the response index for
fear- and happy-face trials (Methods and Eq. S1). To assess
statistical significance, we estimated the null distribution by first
randomly shuffling the labels of trials (fear–happy) and then
computing the population summary metric. We repeated this
permutation test 1,000 times. We then compared the observed
value of the metric with this null distribution of metrics. The
chance values of the null distribution were clustered around 0 as
expected (Fig. 5, gray). In contrast, the value of the population
effect metric was 25.0% for correct trials [Fig. 5, red; P < 0.001
(estimated by counting the number of permutation runs from the
null distribution that had a population metric greater than the
observed value)], which is expected as the cells were selected for
this effect in the first place. However, as cells were selected
considering only correct trials, incorrect trials remain statistically
independent. We found that the population response metric of
incorrect trials was significantly negative [−4.63%, P = 0.002
(estimated by counting the number of permutation runs from
null distribution that had a population metric smaller than ob-
served value); Fig. 5, blue]. Importantly, the metric from the
incorrect trials was significantly negative and thus on the oppo-
site side of the null distribution compared with the metric from
correct trials (Fig. 5, blue). This shows that when the behavioral
response was incorrect (opposite what was shown on the screen),
the neuronal response was consistent with the behavioral re-
sponse rather than the ground truth (if the blue bar were on the
same side as the red bar, by contrast, it would indicate that
neuronal responses instead tracked the emotion shown in the
stimulus). We thus conclude that the 41 emotion-selective neu-
rons signaled the subjective emotional judgment. We found
similar results when we considered fear- and happy-selective
neurons separately (Fig. S5).
Were the results influenced by difficulty? The mean number
of bubbles shown was 38.2 ± 34.2 (mean ± SD) for correct and
21.9 ± 21.2 for incorrect trials (P < 10−10, unpaired t test). Thus, as
expected, incorrect trials tended to occur when less visual in-
formation was revealed. As a control, we repeated our analysis
by using only a subset of trials such that, on average, equal
amounts of the eye and mouth ROIs were revealed (on average,
28.92 ± 26.90 for correct trials and 28.86 ± 26.91 for incorrect
trials, two-tailed paired t test: P > 0.05; and for each individual
session, P > 0.05 for both fear-correct vs. fear-incorrect and
happy-correct vs. happy-incorrect). We found very similar results
(Fig. S6 A–C), confirming that emotion-selective neurons signal
the perceptual judgment independent of difficulty. We also re-
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Fig. 5. Mean response across all emotion-selective neurons encoded sub-
jective perceptual judgment. The gray distribution is the null distribution
derived from a permutation test. The red and blue bars are the population
summary metrics for correct and incorrect trials, respectively. Both were lo-
cated outside the null distribution (P < 0.005 for all, estimated by counting
the number of permutation runs from the null distribution that had a pop-
ulation metric greater–smaller than the observed value). Note that the blue
and red bars were located on opposite sides of the null distribution.
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peated the analysis by using equal numbers of trials for correct
and incorrect to exclude any potential bias and we found very
similar results (Fig. S6 D–F). We further repeated the analysis by
excluding any recordings obtained from epileptic tissue (31 out
of a total of 210 units were from tissue subsequently resected as
part of the epileptic focus, among which 10 units were fear-
selective and 1 unit was happy-selective). The results were quali-
tatively the same (Fig. S6 G–I). Finally, two of the neurosurgical
patients had a clinical diagnosis of autism (17). We repeated the
analysis after excluding these two patients and again found very
similar results (Fig. S6 J–L).
A Full Inventory of Neurons in the Amygdala That Encode Perceptual
Judgment.How representative were the subsets of cells described
so far of the entire population of amygdala neurons recorded?
We next conducted a permutation analysis on the entire pop-
ulation of cells to assess the likely effect size across the pop-
ulation. This analysis used independent subsets of trials for cell
selection and response quantification during each repetition of
the permutation. We ran 1,000 iterations in total. In each, we
randomly selected half of the correct trials to select emotion-
selective units and to classify them as either fear- or happy-
selective. Subsequently, we calculated the response indices for the
remaining half of the correct trials and all incorrect trials. Again,
we calculated the population summary metric (as shown in Fig.
5) but only using this independent subset of trials not previously
used for selecting the cells. For the null distribution, we did the
same permutation test (1,000 runs) with randomly shuffled trial
labels. However, here we still use half of the trials to select cells
and the other half to predict response indices. The complete
independence between selection and prediction ensured our
results against biases and false positives during selection because
only out-of-sample errors were calculated.
Out of the 210 neurons recorded, we considered 185 cells with
>0.2-Hz firing rate for this analysis. Many cells were reliably
selected over the 1,000 repetitions (Fig. 6A, Upper; 40 and 34
cells were selected in at least 10% of runs for fear and happy
conditions, respectively). In contrast, selection was random in
the control condition with permuted labels (Fig. 6A, Lower; no
cells were selected in at least 10% of the runs). Not surprisingly,
there was considerable overlap between the cells consistently
selected by the present split analysis and the cells selected with
all trials (n = 41) as analyzed previously. In contrast, for the
permutation test which randomly shuffled labels, each cell was
equally likely to be selected with a probability of 0.05; the se-
lected cells were evenly distributed across all 185 cells and across
permutation runs (Fig. 6A, Lower) and did not show a bias
toward those that could be selected with all trials. On average,
16.3 ± 3.1 (mean ± SD) units (8.8% of 185) were categorized as
fear-selective and 13.5 ± 2.8 (7.3% of 185) as happy-selective, above
the chance estimate of 9.25 cells for each category (P < 0.01 for
fear-selective and P = 0.077 for happy-selective; Fig. 6B). In con-
trast, the control permutation test resulted in 9.2 ± 3.0 units that
were fear-selective and 9.4 ± 2.8 units that were happy-selective
(Fig. 6B, Middle), with no difference between the two categories
(P = 0.14) and the chance value 9.25 (P > 0.05 for both). Fur-
thermore, the symmetric shape of the null distribution (Fig. S7)
showed that the permutation test was not biased.
We next quantified the responses of the groups of cells selected
in each run using the population summary metric as described
above (Fig. 7). The population summary metric is calculated as the
difference between the average of response indices from all fear-
face trials (either correct or incorrect) collapsed across all selected
cells and the average of response indices from all happy-face trials
(either correct or incorrect) collapsed across all selected cells (Eq.
S1). The population metric here combined both fear- and happy-
selective cells. The population response was significantly different
from the null distribution, for both correct trials and incorrect
trials (unpaired two-tailed t test, P < 0.0001). The distribution of
the incorrect trials was shifted in the opposite direction relative to
the distribution of the correct trials. This also held separately for
fear- and happy-selective neurons (see Fig. S7 for population
metric distributions separately for fear- and happy-selective
neurons). Thus, the neural signals always followed the behavioral
response instead of stimulus ground truth, regardless of whether
the behavioral response was correct or incorrect. We thus conclude
that emotion-selective neurons in the amygdala encode perceptual
judgment robustly.
Neuronal Response Characteristics Dependent on Facial Information
Revealed.Were the emotion-selective units predominantly driven
by information conveyed by specific parts of the face? We ran-
domly revealed parts of the face, allowing us to select subsets of
trials that reveal only specific parts of the face. We selected trials
according to how much of the predefined eye and mouth ROIs
was revealed (shown in Fig. 1C). The more overlap between
bubbles and ROIs, the more is revealed within the ROIs speci-
fied. We picked two types of ROI trials: “High Eye AND Low
Fig. 6. Illustration of the split analysis method to compute the population
response (see Fig. 7 for results). (A) Cells selected across runs. A black dot
indicates that a particular cell was selected. There was substantial consis-
tency of cells selected in the split analysis (Upper) but cell selection was
evenly distributed across cells and runs in the permutation test (Lower). (B)
Summary of the number of cells selected across all runs. Gray and red vertical
line indicates the mean of the chance and actual distribution, respectively.
The number of cells selected in the split analysis was well above chance
whereas the number of cells selected in the permutation test was near chance.
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Fig. 7. Quantification of the population response using split analysis. (A)
Emotion-selective neurons are primarily driven by information revealed by
the eyes. (B) Hippocampal neurons also encode emotions but not subjective
judgment. In contrast, a subset of amygdala neurons equal to the total
number of hippocampal neurons (n = 67) could encode both emotion and
subjective judgment as computed from the entire amygdala neuron pop-
ulation. Red: population metric from correct trials. Blue: population metric
from incorrect trials. Gray: population metric from trials with shuffled labels.
Error bars denote 95% confidence interval. ***: P < 0.001. Only correct trials
were analyzed for the ROI-restricted analysis.
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Mouth” (Fig. 7A; see Fig. S8 A and B for the distribution), and
“Low Eye AND High Mouth” (Fig. 7A; see Fig. S8 C and D for
the distribution). “High” or “low” here refer to above or below
the median across all correct trials of each subject. The con-
junction between one high facial feature and one low facial
feature ensured that the neuronal response was primarily driven
by one facial feature only. We subsequently repeated the split
analysis as described above on these ROI trials. Because only
correct trials were involved in the selection of ROI trials, the
distributions in Fig. 7A did not involve incorrect trials (the in-
correct trials may not obey the above division according to eye
and mouth ROIs). The population metric here combined both
fear- and happy-selective cells.
Information conveyed by the eyes strongly modulated the
neuronal response (Fig. 7A and Fig. S8 A and B). On average,
16.7 ± 3.2 (mean ± SD) cells were selected as fear-selective
neurons and 10.0 ± 2.4 cells were selected as happy-selective
neurons, both significantly above chance (P < 0.001; Fig. S8E).
For this subset, the separation between the distribution of cor-
rect trials (red) and null distribution (gray) was prominent (un-
paired two-sample t test: P < 0.0001) and the difference was
much larger than with all trials (P < 0.0001; Fig. 7A). The results
held when analyzing fear-selective and happy-selective neurons
separately (both P < 0.0001; Fig. S8 A and B).
In contrast, information provided by the mouth did not mod-
ulate neuronal response strongly, as shown by the overlap between
the distribution of correct trials and the null distribution (P =
0.59). Although we observed a statistically significant difference
when analyzing separately for fear-selective neurons and happy-
selective neurons, the difference was very small (Fig. S8 C and D).
On average, 10.8 ± 2.9 cells were selected as happy-selective
neurons, which was significantly above chance (P < 0.0001; Fig.
S8F). By contrast, only 8.3 ± 2.4 cells were selected as fear-selective
neurons, which was significantly below the chance value of 9.25
(P < 0.0001; Fig. S8F), indicating that when eyes were absent and
mouth was present, the neuronal response to fear faces was
suppressed.
In conclusion, we found that information conveyed by eyes but
not the mouth modulated emotion-selective neuronal responses
in the amygdala.
Specificity of the Amygdala Neurons in Coding Subjective Judgment.
How specific were amygdala neurons in encoding subjective
judgment? We next analyzed neurons from an adjacent brain
region—the hippocampus—to test the specificity of amygdala
neurons in coding subjective judgment. We recorded in total 67
single neurons in 6 sessions from 4 patients (2 patients had 2
sessions; see Table S1). Sixty-three cells had a firing rate greater
than 0.2 Hz and were used for the subsequent analyses. Using
identical criteria as for the analysis of amygdala neurons, we
found four fear-selective neurons (6.4%) and seven happy-
selective neurons (11.1%).
We repeated the split analysis for the entire population of
hippocampal cells using a random subset of 50% of the trials to
select the neurons and the remaining 50% of the trials to
quantify the response. We ran 1,000 iterations in total. For the
null distribution, we conducted the same permutation test with
randomly shuffled trial labels. The result shows that both happy-
selective neurons and fear-selective neurons were consistently
selected across repetitions (Fig. S9A). Interestingly, only happy-
selective neurons, but not fear-selective neurons were selected
above chance (Fig. S9B). The selected neurons differentiated
fear from happy faces in correct trials (P < 0.001; Fig. 7B; also
see Fig. S9 D and E). Thus, a subset of hippocampal neurons
distinguished happy from fear emotions in correct trials. Cru-
cially, however, this was only the case for correct trials. In con-
trast with the amygdala neurons, the hippocampal neurons did
not indicate the behavioral response made during incorrect tri-
als. Rather, the response indicated, albeit only weakly so (Fig.
7B), what the correct response would have been (ground truth,
as shown on the screen). The crucial difference, however, is that
the distribution of the response during incorrect trials was shifted
in the same direction (P < 0.001) relative to the distribution of
the correct trials. This is in contrast with the amygdala neurons,
for which the distribution of the response during the incorrect
trials was shifted in the opposite direction relative to the distri-
bution of the correct trials (Fig. 7A). In conclusion, hippocampal
neurons, unlike amygdala neurons, did not track the subjective
judgment of facial emotion in incorrect trials.
There were fewer hippocampal neurons than amygdala neu-
rons (67 vs. 210), which could have biased the effect size. We
thus next repeated the analysis of the amygdala neurons by
randomly selecting a subset of 67 amygdala neurons in each run
of the split analysis. We found very similar results compared with
the entire population of amygdala neurons (Fig. 7B; but note the
larger variance due to fewer number of neurons), and again
found a different pattern of results than what was seen in the
hippocampus (with an identical number of selected neurons).
In conclusion, we found that only amygdala neurons, but not hip-
pocampal neurons, indicated the subjective judgment of emotions.
RT and Laterality Analysis. In an attempt to distinguish perceptual
judgments from motor outputs, we lastly analyzed whether the
response of emotion-selective units was correlated with behav-
ioral output. We found no significant correlation between firing
rate and RT, and we found that the emotion-selective neurons
were not lateralized or related to the output button response
associated with the emotion (see SI Results for details). Our
results suggest that the amygdala encodes the subjective judg-
ment of emotional faces, but that it plays less of a role in helping
to program behavioral responses.
Discussion
In this study, we found that a subset of amygdala neurons enc-
odes the subjective judgment of the emotion shown in faces.
Behaviorally, our epilepsy patients did not differ from healthy
controls in terms of learning performance on the task, and both
epilepsy patients and control subjects primarily used the eye
region of the stimuli to correctly judge fear faces and primarily
used the mouth region to correctly judge happy faces, findings
consistent with prior studies (34, 35). Forty-one out of 185 cells
significantly differentiated the two emotions, and subsequent
analyses indicated that these cells encoded the patients’ subjective
judgment regardless of whether it was correct or incorrect. Pop-
ulation permutation analysis with full independence between se-
lection and prediction confirmed the robustness of this result
when tested across the entire population. ROI analysis revealed
that eyes but not the mouth strongly modulated population
neuronal responses to emotions. Lastly, when we carried out
identical recordings, in the same patients, from neurons within
the hippocampus, we found responses driven only by the objec-
tive emotion shown in the face stimulus, and no evidence for
responses driven by subjective judgment.
It is notable that the population response metric for the cor-
rect trials was further away from the null distribution relative to
the incorrect trials (25.0% vs. −4.63%). It is not surprising that
the strength of emotion coding in incorrect trials was weaker
given fewer incorrect trials and thus potentially increased vari-
ability and decreased reliability. In addition, incorrect trials were
likely a mixture of different types of error trials, such as true mis-
identifications of emotion, guesses, or accidental motor errors.
Regardless, on average, the neural response during incorrect trials
reliably indicated the subjectively perceived emotion. This suggests
that a proportion of error trials was likely true misidentifications
of the emotion rather than pure guesses.
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Interestingly, there was a significant difference between the
two types of happy subjective judgments (comparing happy-
correct and fear-incorrect; Fig. 4E). This might reflect a different
strategy used by subjects to compare the two emotions in our
specific task. Future studies with a range of different tasks will be
needed to understand how relative coding of emotion identity
and task demands may interact in shaping neuronal responses.
Possible Confounds. Our stimuli were based on the well-validated
set of facial emotion images from Ekman and Friesen (37), from
which we chose a subset depicting fear and happy emotions with
the highest reliability. We normalized these base faces for lu-
minance, orientation, color, and spatial frequency, eliminating
these low-level visual properties as possible confounds. Likewise,
we showed a balanced number of male and female faces, and
multiple identities, ensuring that neither sex nor individual identity
of the face was driving the responses we report (each of these was
completely uncorrelated with the emotion shown in the face).
Nonetheless, it remains possible that our findings reflect higher-
level properties that are correlated with the emotions fear and
happiness—such as negative versus positive valence. Furthermore,
because we only tested two facial emotions, our conclusions can
only speak to the emotions that we tested and are relative to the
task that we used. Different facial regions would have likely been
informative for other facial emotions (had the task been a dis-
crimination task that required a choice between, say, surprise and
happiness), and we do not know whether the cells studied here
might contribute to perceptual decisions for other emotions.
A larger set of emotions, as well as of facial expressions without
emotional meaning, would be important to study in future studies.
Our results suggest that emotion-selective neurons were not
merely encoding the motor output associated with the perceived
emotions (button press), as corroborated by the lack of corre-
lation between the neuronal and behavioral response [consistent
with similar prior findings (16)], and the lack of lateralization of
emotion neurons given the lateralized and fixed motor output
actions. Although there has been a recent report of an in-
teraction between spatial laterality and reward coding in the
primate amygdala probed with lateralized reward cues (38), that
effect appeared primarily as a difference in latency but not as the
lateralization of reward-coding neurons to the reward-predicting
cues. It will be interesting to investigate in future studies whether
these findings with basic rewards (38) can be generalized to
emotions or other salient stimuli.
We initially selected emotion-selective neurons using a one-
tailed t test of fear vs. happy for correct trials only. Clearly, some
cells surviving this test will be false positives; to quantify the
robustness of the effect we thus conducted several additional
analyses. First, we conducted a 50/50 split analysis procedure,
which keeps the trials used for selection and prediction in-
dependent (Fig. 6). The result (Fig. 7) is an out-of-sample esti-
mate of the true effect size and would thus not be expected to be
different from chance if all selected cells were false positives. In
contrast, we observed a highly reliable effect (Fig. 7), which is
very unlikely to be driven by chance alone. Second, the sets of
cells selected by the two different methods were comparable,
showing that emotion-selective neurons were consistently se-
lected even with a random subset of trials. Third, we rigorously
established chance levels using permutation tests (Fig. 7) and
found that the number of cells selected was well above chance
(Fig. 6). Fourth, we conducted additional control analyses using
a time window −250 ms to 750 ms relative to scramble onset (no
information about the upcoming face was available during this
time window). The number of selected cells was as expected by
chance and we did not find the significant patterns we report in
the case of responses to faces. Similarly, we also did not replicate
the pattern of amygdala responses to faces when we analyzed
responses from hippocampal neurons. Taken together, the last
two findings provide both stimulus specificity and neuroana-
tomical specificity to our conclusions. Lastly, we conducted
analyses using a random subset of the amygdala neurons (n = 67,
the number of hippocampal neurons recorded) at each permu-
tation run and we derived qualitatively the same results (Fig. 7B),
showing that our results were not driven by a particular subset
of neurons.
Selectivity of Amygdala Neurons. Faces can be readily character-
ized by independent attributes, such as identity, expression, and
sex, which have segregated cortical representations (13, 39), and
single-unit recordings in the primate amygdala have documented
responses selective for faces, their identity, or emotional ex-
pression (10, 14). We previously showed that neurons in the
human amygdala selectively respond to whole faces compared
with facial parts, suggesting a predominant role of the amygdala
in representing global information about faces (16). How do
these whole-face-selective cells overlap with the emotion-selec-
tive cells we report in the present work? We found 3 out of
24 (12.5%) fear-selective cells and 5 out of 17 (29.4%) happy-
selective cells are also whole-face-selective, a ratio of whole-face
cells similar to that found in the entire population (36 out of 185,
19.5%). This suggests that amygdala neurons encode whole-face
information and emotion independently.
We found that face information conveyed by the eyes, but not
the mouth region, modulated emotion-selective neuronal respon-
ses. Compared with our previous neuronal classification images
which were based on pixelwise analyses of face regions that drive
neuronal response (17), we here used a fully independent per-
mutation test to further illustrate that when eyes are more visible,
the population of neurons can discriminate the emotions better
(also see Table S2). Together with a substantial prior literature,
this finding supports the idea that amygdala neurons synthesize
their responses based substantially on information from the eye
region of faces (18, 21, 34).
The Amygdala, Consciousness, and Perception. Does the amygdala’s
response to emotional faces require, or contribute to, consci-
ous awareness? Some studies have suggested that emotional
faces can modulate amygdala activity without explicit aware-
ness of the stimuli (40, 41), and there are reports of amygdala
blood-oxygen–level dependent (BOLD) discrimination to the
presentation of fear faces even if such faces are presented to
patients in their blind hemifield in cases of hemianopia due to
cortical lesions (42). Our finding that amygdala neurons track
subjective perceptual judgment argues for a key role in conscious
perception, although it does not rule out a role in nonconscious
processing as well. Further support for a role in contributing to
our conscious awareness of the stimuli comes from the long re-
sponse latencies we observed, consistent with previous findings
on long latencies in the medial temporal lobe (43). Our findings
suggest that the amygdala might interact with visual cortices in
the temporal lobe to construct our conscious percept of the
emotion shown in a face, an interaction that likely requires ad-
ditional components such as frontal cortex, whose identity
remains to be fully investigated (44). In particular, because we
failed to find any coding of subjectively perceived emotion in the
hippocampus, it will be an important future direction to record
from additional brain regions to fully understand how the amyg-
dala responses we report might be synthesized.
Microstimulation of inferotemporal cortex in monkeys (45)
and electrical brain stimulation in fusiform areas in humans (46)
have suggested a causal role of the temporal cortex in face cat-
egorization and perception. Future studies using direct stimula-
tion of the amygdala will be important to further determine the
nature of its contribution to the subjective perception of facial
emotion. Given the long average response latency observed in
the amygdala neurons we analyzed, it may well be that the
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responses we report here reflect perceptual decisions that were
already computed at an earlier time epoch. We would favor
a distributed view, in which the subjective perceptual decision of
the facial emotion emerges over some window of time, and
drawing on a spatially distributed set of regions. The neuronal
responses we report in the amygdala may be integral part of such
computations, or they may instead reflect the readout of pro-
cesses that have already occurred elsewhere in the brain. Only
concurrent recordings from multiple brain regions will be able to
fully resolve this issue in future studies.
Comparison with Neuroimaging Studies and Functional Role of the
Amygdala.We further compare our study with neuroimaging studies
and discuss the functional role of the amygdala in SI Discussion.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we suggest that the amygdala serves to integrate
sensory information about faces, conveyed via temporal neo-
cortex, with reward value (47), task, and social context (48),
through its dense web of connectivity with structures such as
basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex. Such processing would un-
derlie the synthesis of subjective judgments about the emotion
shown in faces, as our present findings demonstrate, and would
also account for the remarkably long neuronal response latencies
that we (16) and others (43) have described previously. Responses
tracking subjective judgments of emotion, in turn, could form the
basis for other social judgments that have been linked to the
amygdala, such as trustworthiness (49) and approachability (50). It
will be critical to compare our findings to responses obtained from
face-selective neurons in temporal cortex (51), which provide
the primary visual input to the amygdala (52), and which in
turn receive feedback from the amygdala (31). It may be that
subjective percepts of facial emotion are represented through
iterative cycles of processing between the amygdala, temporal
cortex, and other brain structures involved in valuation and
social inference.
Methods
In this study we recorded single units from 10 neurosurgical patients who had
chronically implanted depth electrodes in the amygdalae (Table S1). Three
patients (total of three sessions) did not contribute well-isolated units and
hence were excluded from analysis. Two patients completed two sessions,
resulting in a total of nine recording sessions that we analyzed. All participants
provided written informed consent according to protocols approved by the
institutional review boards of the Huntington Memorial Hospital, Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center, and the California Institute of Technology.
The subjects’ electrophysiology as well as construction of bubbles stimuli,
scrambled face stimuli, and classification images were described in our
previous publications (16, 17).
Task.Weused a facial emotion discrimination task in which patients were asked
to judge fear or happy faces as quickly and accurately as possible from randomly
selected parts of the face (bubbles; Fig. 1B). In each trial, a scrambled face with
a central fixation circle was presented for 0.8–1.2 s (randomized). Then the
target face stimulus was presented for 500 ms and a blank gray screen fol-
lowed. Patients started to respond after the target face stimulus onset and,
regardless of RT, the next trial started after an interval of 2.3–2.7 s after
stimulus onset. If the patient did not respond by that time, a timeout was in-
dicated by a beep (2.2% of trials were timeouts) (Fig. 1A). Each block contained
72 trials and patients completed 5–7 blocks. Timeout trials were excluded from
analysis so all trials included had a behavioral response. We displayed the
performance score to the patients at the end of each block as an incentive.
Weused eight face base images [chosen from the Ekmanand Friesen stimulus
set, four different individuals (two female and two male)] showing fear and
happy expressions each. We normalized all faces for mean luminance, contrast,
and position of eyes and mouth. We randomly flipped 50%of the stimuli along
the vertical axis to prevent any influence of left–right asymmetries present in the
faces. This resulted in 16 different face images in total and these face stimuli
were then sparsely sampled and presented to participants.
Data Analysis: Spikes. Only single units with an average firing rate of at least 0.2
Hz (entire task) were considered. Trials were aligned to stimulus onset, except
when comparing the baseline (a 1-s interval of blank screen right before scramble
onset) to the scramble response for which trials were aligned to scramble onset
(which precedes the stimulus onset). Average firing rates [poststimulus time
histogram (PSTH); Figs. 2 and 3] were computed by counting spikes across all trials
in consecutive 250-ms bins. To investigate the temporal dynamics of the signifi-
cant difference, pairwise comparison was made at each bin using a two-tailed
t test at P < 0.05 and Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons across bins in
the group PSTH (this is not the unit selection). The PSTHs of individual neuron
examples were smoothed by a Gaussian kernel with sigma 200 ms (for plotting
purposes only, all statistics are based on the raw counts).
Data Analysis: Selection of Emotion-Selective and Interactive Units. Statistical
comparisons between the firing rates in response to different stimuli were
based on the total number of spikes produced by each unit in a 1.5-s interval
starting at 250 ms after stimulus onset (Figs. 2 and 3). Based on behavior, we
categorized each trial as either correct or incorrect. In the following, correct–
incorrect thus always refers to whether or not the subject successfully
identified the correct emotion of the stimulus shown (fear or happy). Be-
cause only two emotions were shown, an incorrect trial always implies that
the subject chose the opposite emotion.
The selection criterion for emotion-selective units (Figs. 2 and 3) was based on
the correct trials only, leaving the incorrect trials statistically independent. Units
were defined as emotion-selective if they responded with a different firing rate
to fear relative to happy faces after stimulus onset. By definition, fear-selective
units responded significantly more in correct fear-face trials compared with
correct happy-face trials, and vice versa for happy-selective units. One-tailed
t tests with P < 0.05 were used.
We also quantified whether units responded to emotions conditionally on
behavior. For this, a two-way ANOVA ([correct vs. incorrect trials] × [fear
stimuli vs. happy stimuli]) was used to probe for a significant interaction
term with P < 0.05 (Fig. 2E).
Data Analysis: Response Index. We quantified for each neuron whether its
response differed between fear-face and happy-face trials using a single-trial
response index Ri (Eq. 1; Fig. 4). The response index can facilitate group
analysis and comparisons between different types of cells (i.e., fear- and
happy-selective cells in this study), as motivated by previous studies (16, 53).
The response index quantifies the response during trial i relative to the
mean response to correct happy stimuli and baseline (a 1-s interval of blank
screen right before scramble onset). The mean response and baseline was
calculated individually for each unit.
Ri =
FRi −mean

FRHappyCorrect

meanðFRBaselineÞ · 100%: [1]
For each trial i, which can be either fear or happy, Ri is the baseline nor-
malized firing rate (FR) during a 1.5-s interval 250-ms post-stimulus-onset
(the same time interval as cell selection). Different time intervals were tested
as well, to ensure that results were qualitatively the same and not biased by
particular spike bins.
If a neuron distinguishes happy from fear-face trials, the average value of
Ri will be significantly different from 0. Because fear-selective neurons have
more spikes in fear-face trials and happy-selective neurons have more spikes
in happy-face trials (the selection process is described above), on average Ri
is positive for fear-selective neurons and negative for happy-selective neu-
rons. To get an aggregate measure of activity that pools across neurons, Ri
was multiplied by −1 if the neuron is classified as a happy-selective neuron
(Eq. 2). This makes Ri on average positive for both types of emotion-selective
neurons. Notice that the factor −1 depends only on the neuron type, which
is determined by t tests on correct trials as described above, but not trial
type. Thus, negative Ri values are still possible.
Ri =− 
FRi −mean

FRHappyCorrect

meanðFRBaselineÞ
· 100%: [2]
After calculating Ri for every trial, we subsequently averaged all Ris of
trials that belong to the same category. We used four categories: fear
correct (FC), fear incorrect (FI), happy correct (HC), and happy incorrect
(HI). By definition, the average value of Ri for HC trial will be equal to zero
because the definition of Ri is relative to the response to happy-face cor-
rect trials (Eq. 2). The mean baseline firing rate was calculated across
all trials. The same FRHappyCorrect was subtracted for both correct and
incorrect trials.
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The cumulative distribution function (CDF) (Fig. 4D and Fig. S4 A and C)
was constructed by calculating for each possible value x of the response
index howmany examples are smaller than x. That is, F(x) = P(X ≤ x), where X
is a vector of all response index values. The CDFs of fear and happy-face trials
were compared using two-tailed two-sample KS tests. All error bars are ± SE
unless indicated otherwise.
Data Analysis: Split Analysis and Permutation Test.We used 1,000 runs for the
permutation analysis. In each run, we randomly selected half of the correct
trials to identify emotion-selective units and to determine the neuron type (as
described above). We then used the remaining half of correct trials to cal-
culate the response indices. This makes the response index values statistically
independent of the cell selection.We also calculated the responses indices for
all of the incorrect trials for the selected cells. To summarize the population
difference in response to fear compared with happy faces, we calculated a
summary population metric that provided a single number for a population
of cells for every run of the permutation test (Figs. 5 and 7). The methods and
equations are detailed in SI Methods.
We further quantified how sensitive neurons were to specific facial parts
by repeating the permutation analysis with only a subset of trials that
revealed the ROI of interest. The methods are detailed in SI Methods.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank all patients for their participation;
Drs. Linda Philpott and William Sutherling for neurological referral and
evaluation of the patients; the staff of the Huntington Memorial Hospital
Epilepsy and Brain Mapping Program for excellent support with participant
testing; Erin Schuman for providing some of the recording equipment; and
Frederic Gosselin for advice on the bubbles method. This research was
supported by grants from the Pfeiffer Family Foundation, the Simons
Foundation, the Department of Neurosurgery at the Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center, and the Conte Center from National Institute of Mental Health.
1. Adolphs R (2010) What does the amygdala contribute to social cognition? Ann N Y
Acad Sci 1191(1):42–61.
2. Kling AS, Brothers LA (1992) The amygdala and social behavior. The Amygdala:
Neurobiological Aspects of Emotion, Memory and Mental Dysfunction, ed Aggleton
JP (Wiley-Liss, New York), pp 353–377.
3. LeDoux JE (1993) Emotional memory systems in the brain. Behav Brain Res 58(1-2):
69–79.
4. Rolls ET (1992) Neurophysiology and functions of the primate amygdala. The
Amygdala: Neurobiological Aspects of Emotion, Memory and Mental Dysfunction, ed
Aggleton JP (Wiley-Liss, New York), pp 143–165.
5. Adolphs R, Tranel D, Damasio H, Damasio A (1994) Impaired recognition of emotion
in facial expressions following bilateral damage to the human amygdala. Nature
372(6507):669–672.
6. Bechara A, et al. (1995) Double dissociation of conditioning and declarative knowl-
edge relative to the amygdala and hippocampus in humans. Science 269(5227):
1115–1118.
7. LaBar KS, LeDoux JE, Spencer DD, Phelps EA (1995) Impaired fear conditioning fol-
lowing unilateral temporal lobectomy in humans. J Neurosci 15(10):6846–6855.
8. Morris JS, et al. (1996) A differential neural response in the human amygdala to
fearful and happy facial expressions. Nature 383(6603):812–815.
9. Kreiman G, Koch C, Fried I (2000) Category-specific visual responses of single neurons
in the human medial temporal lobe. Nat Neurosci 3(9):946–953.
10. Fried I, MacDonald KA, Wilson CL (1997) Single neuron activity in human hippo-
campus and amygdala during recognition of faces and objects. Neuron 18(5):753–765.
11. Fitzgerald DA, Angstadt M, Jelsone LM, Nathan PJ, Phan KL (2006) Beyond threat:
Amygdala reactivity across multiple expressions of facial affect. Neuroimage 30(4):
1441–1448.
12. Leonard CM, Rolls ET, Wilson FA, Baylis GC (1985) Neurons in the amygdala of the
monkey with responses selective for faces. Behav Brain Res 15(2):159–176.
13. Rolls ET (1984) Neurons in the cortex of the temporal lobe and in the amygdala of the
monkey with responses selective for faces. Hum Neurobiol 3(4):209–222.
14. Gothard KM, Battaglia FP, Erickson CA, Spitler KM, Amaral DG (2007) Neural
responses to facial expression and face identity in the monkey amygdala.
J Neurophysiol 97(2):1671–1683.
15. Hoffman KL, Gothard KM, Schmid MC, Logothetis NK (2007) Facial-expression and
gaze-selective responses in the monkey amygdala. Curr Biol 17(9):766–772.
16. Rutishauser U, et al. (2011) Single-unit responses selective for whole faces in the
human amygdala. Curr Biol 21(19):1654–1660.
17. Rutishauser U, et al. (2013) Single-neuron correlates of atypical face processing in
autism. Neuron 80(4):887–899.
18. Adolphs R, et al. (2005) A mechanism for impaired fear recognition after amygdala
damage. Nature 433(7021):68–72.
19. Sander D, et al. (2005) Emotion and attention interactions in social cognition: Brain
regions involved in processing anger prosody. Neuroimage 28(4):848–858.
20. Adolphs R (2008) Fear, faces, and the human amygdala. Curr Opin Neurobiol 18(2):
166–172.
21. Gamer M, Büchel C (2009) Amygdala activation predicts gaze toward fearful eyes.
J Neurosci 29(28):9123–9126.
22. Sasson N, et al. (2007) Orienting to social stimuli differentiates social cognitive im-
pairment in autism and schizophrenia. Neuropsychologia 45(11):2580–2588.
23. Horley K, Williams LM, Gonsalvez C, Gordon E (2004) Face to face: Visual scanpath
evidence for abnormal processing of facial expressions in social phobia. Psychiatry Res
127(1-2):43–53.
24. Pelphrey KA, et al. (2002) Visual scanning of faces in autism. J Autism Dev Disord
32(4):249–261.
25. Baron-Cohen S, et al. (2000) The amygdala theory of autism. Neurosci Biobehav Rev
24(3):355–364.
26. Hadj-Bouziane F, et al. (2012) Amygdala lesions disrupt modulation of functional MRI
activity evoked by facial expression in the monkey inferior temporal cortex. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 109(52):E3640–E3648.
27. Moeller S, Freiwald WA, Tsao DY (2008) Patches with links: A unified system for
processing faces in the macaque temporal lobe. Science 320(5881):1355–1359.
28. Vuilleumier P, Richardson MP, Armony JL, Driver J, Dolan RJ (2004) Distant influences
of amygdala lesion on visual cortical activation during emotional face processing. Nat
Neurosci 7(11):1271–1278.
29. Desimone R, Gross CG (1979) Visual areas in the temporal cortex of the macaque.
Brain Res 178(2-3):363–380.
30. Amaral DG, Behniea H, Kelly JL (2003) Topographic organization of projections from
the amygdala to the visual cortex in the macaque monkey. Neuroscience 118(4):
1099–1120.
31. Freese JL, Amaral DG (2006) Synaptic organization of projections from the amygdala
to visual cortical areas TE and V1 in the macaque monkey. J Comp Neurol 496(5):
655–667.
32. Ghashghaei HT, Barbas H (2002) Pathways for emotion: Interactions of prefrontal and
anterior temporal pathways in the amygdala of the rhesus monkey. Neuroscience
115(4):1261–1279.
33. Gosselin F, Schyns PG (2001) Bubbles: A technique to reveal the use of information in
recognition tasks. Vision Res 41(17):2261–2271.
34. Scheller E, Büchel C, Gamer M (2012) Diagnostic features of emotional expressions are
processed preferentially. PLoS ONE 7(7):e41792.
35. Smith ML, Cottrell GW, Gosselin F, Schyns PG (2005) Transmitting and decoding facial
expressions. Psychol Sci 16(3):184–189.
36. Oya H, Kawasaki H, Dahdaleh NS, Wemmie JA, Howard MA, 3rd (2009) Stereotactic
atlas-based depth electrode localization in the human amygdala. Stereotact Funct
Neurosurg 87(4):219–228.
37. Ekman P, Friesen WV (1975) Unmasking the Face: A Guide to Recognizing Emotions
from Facial Clues (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).
38. Peck CJ, Lau B, Salzman CD (2013) The primate amygdala combines information
about space and value. Nat Neurosci 16(3):340–348.
39. Perrett DI, et al. (1984) Neurones responsive to faces in the temporal cortex: Studies
of functional organization, sensitivity to identity and relation to perception. Hum
Neurobiol 3(4):197–208.
40. Whalen PJ, et al. (1998) Masked presentations of emotional facial expressions mod-
ulate amygdala activity without explicit knowledge. J Neurosci 18(1):411–418.
41. Morris JS, Ohman A, Dolan RJ (1998) Conscious and unconscious emotional learning in
the human amygdala. Nature 393(6684):467–470.
42. Morris JS, DeGelder B, Weiskrantz L, Dolan RJ (2001) Differential extrageniculostriate
and amygdala responses to presentation of emotional faces in a cortically blind field.
Brain 124(Pt 6):1241–1252.
43. Mormann F, et al. (2008) Latency and selectivity of single neurons indicate hierar-
chical processing in the human medial temporal lobe. J Neurosci 28(36):8865–8872.
44. Pessoa L, Adolphs R (2010) Emotion processing and the amygdala: From a ‘low road’ to
‘many roads’ of evaluating biological significance. Nat Rev Neurosci 11(11):773–783.
45. Afraz S-R, Kiani R, Esteky H (2006) Microstimulation of inferotemporal cortex influ-
ences face categorization. Nature 442(7103):692–695.
46. Parvizi J, et al. (2012) Electrical stimulation of human fusiform face-selective regions
distorts face perception. J Neurosci 32(43):14915–14920.
47. Paton JJ, Belova MA, Morrison SE, Salzman CD (2006) The primate amygdala
represents the positive and negative value of visual stimuli during learning. Nature
439(7078):865–870.
48. Kim H, et al. (2004) Contextual modulation of amygdala responsivity to surprised
faces. J Cogn Neurosci 16(10):1730–1745.
49. Adolphs R, Tranel D, Damasio AR (1998) The human amygdala in social judgment.
Nature 393(6684):470–474.
50. Kennedy DP, Gläscher J, Tyszka JM, Adolphs R (2009) Personal space regulation by the
human amygdala. Nat Neurosci 12(10):1226–1227.
51. Tsao DY, Freiwald WA, Tootell RBH, Livingstone MS (2006) A cortical region consisting
entirely of face-selective cells. Science 311(5761):670–674.
52. Amaral DG, Price JL, Pitkanen A, Carmichael ST (1992) Anatomical organization of the
primate amygdaloid complex. The Amygdala: Neurobiological Aspects of Emotion,
Memory and Mental Dysfunction, ed Aggleton JP (Wiley-Liss, New York), pp 1–66.
53. Rutishauser U, Schuman EM, Mamelak AN (2008) Activity of human hippocampal and
amygdala neurons during retrieval of declarative memories. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
105(1):329–334.
Wang et al. PNAS | Published online June 30, 2014 | E3119
N
EU
RO
SC
IE
N
CE
PN
A
S
PL
U
S
